






The Good: An Investigation into the Relationships
Among the Concepts of the Good, the Highest Good,
Goodness, Final Goodness and Non-instrumental Goodness
Abstract
This paper is about The Good and its relation to various kinds of goodness. I will investigate 
what it means to say that something is a highest good, a final all-inclusive, complete, or 
greatest good, and I will consider some definitions of ‘instrumental’ and ‘non-instrumental’ 
goodness. I will prove several interesting theorems about The Good and explore some of the 
essential relationships between various kinds of goodness.
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the	concept	 is	first	 and	foremost	associated	with	Plato	(Republic, Philebus, 
Timaeus;	Lodge,	1927,	1927b),	Aristotle	(The Nicomachean Ethics;	Aufder-
heide	and	Bader,	2015),	and	various	(neo-)	Platonists:	Plotinus	(The Enneads;	
see,	especially	 the	ninth	 tractate),	Proclus	(The Elements of Theology),	etc.	
During	the	Middle	Ages,	many	philosophers	and	theologians	such	as	Boethi-
us,	Albert	 the	Great,	Thomas	Aquinas,	Bonaventure,	 and	William	Ockham	




























tions.	Hence,	 this	paper	 is	a	 logical	and	metaphysical	 investigation	 into	 the	
concept	of	The	Good	and	its	relation	to	various	kinds	of	goodness.	
According	to	Aristotle,	“the	good	has	rightly	been	declared	to	be	that	at	which	







The Good ought to be	realised,	but	it	is	not	(logically)	necessary	that	it	is (or 
will	 be)	 realised;	 there	 are	 (logically)	 possible	worlds	 in	which	The	Good	
does not obtain.1 
According	to	Kant:













be realised (see above).




is meant the best state of things conceivable,	the	Summum	Bonum	or	Absolute	Good.	It	is	in	
this	sense	that	a	right	conception	of	Heaven	would	be	a	right	conception	of	the	Ideal:	we	mean	
by	the	Ideal	a	state	of	things	which	would	be	absolutely	perfect.	But	this	conception	may	be	
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(von	Wright,	 1967).	C.	Korsgaard	 thinks	 that	 two	distinctions	 in	goodness	
are	often	conflated:	 the	distinction	between	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	goodness,	
and	 the	 distinction	 between	 final	 or	 instrumental	 goods	 (Korsgaard,	 1983,	
reprinted	in	Korsgaard,	1996,	Chapter	9).	Additionally,	there	are	many	other	
distinctions	between	various	kinds	of	goodness	in	the	literature.	In	this	paper,	
I	will	 investigate	what	 it	means	to	say	that	something	(a	state	of	affairs)	 is	
good	(all-things-considered),	a highest good, a final, all-inclusive, complete, 







such	that	X	is	a	(necessary)	means	to	Y	(Definition	 7,	D7). X  is non-instru-
mentally	good	iff	X	is	good,	and	there	is	no	distinct	good	Y	such	that	X is a 
(necessary)	means	to	Y	(Definition	8,	D8).
I	will	 furthermore	prove	several	 interesting	theorems	about	The	Good.	Ac-











1   
We	can,	 in	 fact,	 prove	 that	The	Good	ought	
to	be	realised	if	we	add	an	ought-operator	to	
the	informal	semantics	that	is	described	in	this	
paper  and  make  some  standard  assumptions  
about	this	operator.	However,	I	will	not	labor	
the details  in the present paper.  For more on 
ought-operators,	 see	 any	 standard	 introduc-
tion	to	deontic	logic,	for	example,	Gabbay	et 
al.,	eds.	2013,	or	Åqvist,	2002.
2   
For	more	on	similar	distinctions	and	notions,	
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2.	‘The	Good’	and	‘Goodness’
‘Good’	 is	 a	word	 that	 is	used	 in	many	different	 senses	and	many	different	
types	of	linguistic	constructions.	Consider	the	following	examples:
‘X	is	good’,	‘It	is	good	to	be	X’,	‘To	be	X	is	good’,	‘It	is	good	to	have	X’,	‘It	
is good that X’,	‘It	would	be	good	if	X’,	‘X is good for Y’,	‘X does good to Y’,	
‘X does Y	good’,	‘X is doing good to Y’,	‘X	will	do	good	to	Y’,	‘X	will	do	Y 
good’,	‘X	would	do	good	to	Y’,	‘X	would	do	Y	good’,	‘X is a good Y’,	‘X Y’s	
good’,	‘X has a good Y’,	‘X is having a good Y’,	‘X is, as Y,	good’,	‘X is good 


















operator,	 it	 takes	 sentences	 as	 arguments	 and	gives	 sentences	 as	 values.	 If	
‘A’	is	a	sentence,	then	‘It	is	good	that	A’	or	‘A	is	good’	is	a	sentence.	Hence,	
goodness	can	be	treated	as	a	property	of	states	of	affairs.	The	Good,	however,	
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from w, then w′	is	one	of	the	best	possible	worlds	that	is	alethically	accessible	














World w′	 is	axiologically	accessible	 from	world	w	 if	and	only	 if	 (iff)	w′	 is	
optimal	in	world	w, and w′	is	optimal	in	w iff w′	is	alethically	accessible	from	
w,	and	there	is	no	other	possible	world	w′′	that	is	alethically	accessible	from	







alent	with	B (A and B	are	necessarily	equivalent)	iff	it	is	necessary	that	A is 









other	possible	world	that	is	alethically	accessible	from	w that is better than w′.
3   
Note	 that	 ‘The	Good’	 is	similar	 to	a	definite	
description,	 such	 as	 ‘the	 tallest	 man	 in	 the	








5	   
Henceforth,	when	I	say	that	something	is	nec-
essary,	I	will	mean	that	it	is	historically	nec-
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When	I	speak	of	goodness	in	this	sense,	I	mean	all-things-considered good-
ness.	To	say	that	it	is	good	that	A	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	A in itself is 
good or that A is intrinsically	good	(whatever	that	means).	Nonetheless,	good-
ness in this sense is not the same thing as instrumental goodness (in the sense 
we	will	define	later;	see	Section	6).	


























sible	world	 is	axiologically	accessible	from	itself,	 iff	 this	possible	world	 is	
optimal	in	this	world,	iff	there	is	no	other	alethically	accessible	world	that	is	
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A	potential	problem	with	a	possible	world	semantics	of	this	kind	is	that	there	










3.	The Good and Goodness
In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 prove	 some	 fundamental	 theorems	 about	 The	Good	
and	goodness	and	about	the	relationships	between	these	concepts.	All	of	the	
theorems	follow	with	necessity	from	our	assumptions.	Accordingly,	we	must	
accept	 the	conclusions	if	we	accept	 the	suppositions.	Conversely,	 it	 is	only	
reasonable	to	reject	some	theorem	if	we	reject	at	least	one	assumption.	These	
theses,	therefore,	illustrate	that	we	can	prove	things	about	The	Good.
T1.	The	Good	 is	good.	 (It	 is	all-things-considered	good	 that	 ‘The	Good’	 is	
true.)7
Proof.	Suppose	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	The	Good	is	good	in	some	possible	
world	w.	Then	 there	 is	 a	possible	world	w′	 that	 is	 axiologically	 accessible	
from w	in	which	The	Good	is	not	true.	If	The	Good	is	not	true,	then	w′	is	not	












6	   
As	 far	 as	 I	 can	 see,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 there	
are things that are all-things-considered good 
even if nothing is intrinsically	good.	If	this	is	







7	   
The  proposition  that  The  Good  is  good  and  
other	theorems	in	this	paper	follow	logically	 
 
from	 our	 definitions	 and	 standard	 (modal)	
logical	 principles.	 Still,	 they	 are	 not	 true	 by	
definition	alone	and	in	some	cases	the	proofs	
are far from obvious. 
8	   
Note	 that	 ‘necessary’	 in	T2	 (and	 in	all	other	
theorems)	means	‘historically	necessary’.	If	it	
is	logically	necessary	that	A, then it is histori-
cally	necessary	that	A,	but	that	it	is	historically	
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accessible	from	w	in	which	The	Good	is	true.	Nevertheless,	we	have	supposed	
that	it	is	true	for	every	possible	world	w	that	there	is	a	possible	world	w′	that	













is	 all-things-considered	good,	 then	 it	 is	historically	necessary	 that	 it	 is	 all-
things-considered	good.)
Proof.	Suppose	that	this	theorem	is	not	true	in	some	possible	world	w. Then it 
is	not	the	case	that	if	it	is	good	that	X,	then	it	is	necessary	that	it	is	good	that	




w′′	is	axiologically	accessible	from	w.	Hence,	X is true in w′′.	However,	this	is	
absurd.	In	conclusion,	the	theorem	must	be	true.	■







Proof.	Assume	that	this	is	not	the	case	in	some	possible	world	w. Then it is 
not	the	case	that	if	it	is	good	that	X,	then	The	Good	necessarily	implies	X in 
w.	Hence,	it	is	true	that	it	is	good	that	X	and	it	is	false	that	it	is	necessary	that	
The Good implies X  in  w.	Accordingly,	 there	 is	a	possible	world	w′	 that	 is	
alethically	accessible	from	w	in	which	The	Good	does	not	materially	imply	
X.	In	w′,	it	is	true	that	The	Good	is	true	and	that	X	is	false.	Since	it	is	true	that	
X is good in w,	it	follows	that	it	is	true	that	it	is	necessary	that	X is good in w 
(by	T5).	Hence,	X is good in w′.	For	w′	is	alethically	accessible	from	w.	Since	
The Good is true in w′,	w′	is	axiologically	accessible	from	itself.	Accordingly,	




it	is	not	the	case	that	if	The	Good	necessarily	implies	X, then it is good that X 
in w.	Hence,	it	is	true	in	w	that	it	is	necessary	that	The	Good	implies	X, and 
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alethically	accessible	from	w.	Accordingly,	The	Good	materially	implies	X in 




















The Good is true in w	while	the	proposition	that	everything	that	is	good	is	true	
is false in w.	Hence,	it	is	not	the	case	that	if	it	is	good	that	X, then X is true in 
w.	Consequently,	it	is	true	that	X is good and false that X is true in w.	Since	
The Good is true in w, w	is	axiologically	accessible	from	itself.	It	follows	that	
X is true in w,	which	is	a	contradiction.	Hence,	the	theorem	must	hold.	■
T10.	If	everything	that	is	good	is	true,	then	The	Good	is	true.10
Proof.	Assume	that	this	theorem	is	false	in	some	possible	world	w. Then it is 
true in w	that	everything	that	is	good	is	true	and	it	is	false	in	w that The Good 
is	true.	Since	everything	that	is	good	is	true	in	w,	it	follows	that	if	The	Good	
is good then The Good is true in w.	Yet,	The	Good	is	good	(by	T1).	Hence,	












9   
The	expression	‘everything’	in	this	and	simi-

















This	 concludes	 our	 discussion	 of	 some	 basic	 properties	 of	The	Good	 and	
goodness	and	their	relationships.	I	will	now	turn	to	the	question	of	how	The	
Good is related to some different kinds of goodness.
4.	Highest	Goodness	and	The	Good








D3. Something is a highest good iff there is nothing that is better than it. 
D2	and	D3	are	equivalent	if	it	is	true	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	Y is better than 








nothing is better than Y,	but	it	is	not	the	case	that	X is at least as good as Y and 
it	is	not	the	case	that	Y is at least as good as X, then X (and Y) is a highest good 
according	to	definition	3	but	not	according	to	definition	2.
I	will	use	definition	3	in	this	paper.	Furthermore,	I	will	define	the	truth-condi-
tions for the betterness	relation	in	the	following	way:
D4. A is better than B	in	the	possible	world	w iff it is possible that A or B in 
w	and	in	all	the	best	possible	worlds	that	are	alethically	accessible	from	w in 










X is good in w and Y is better than X in w. Therefore, X is true in one of the 
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optimal	worlds,	say	w′,	in	w	in	which	Verum	(=	A or not-A) is true. For Verum 
is	true	in	every	possible	world	and	we	have	assumed	that	there	is	always	one	
alethically	optimal	world	accessible	in	every	possible	world.	Hence,	Y or X is 
true in w′.	Accordingly,	w′	is	also	one	of	the	optimal	worlds	in	w	in	which	Y 








Good	 is	 good	 (T1).	 Consequently,	 there	 is	 nothing	 that	 is	 better	 than	The	
Good.	■
T15. The Good is a highest good.












this kind of goodness.
5.	Complete	Goodness	and	The	Good
In	this	section,	I	will	define	the	concept	of	a complete good.	I	will	also	speak	
about a final, all-inclusive good or a greatest good;	I	use	all	of	these	phrases	




D5.	Something	 is	a	complete	 (final,	 all-inclusive,	or	greatest)	good	 iff	 it	 is	
good	and	everything	that	is	good	is	a	(necessary)	means	to	it.
This	definition	 can	be	equivalently	stated	in	the	following	way:	Something	
is	a	complete	good	iff	 it	 is	good	and	everything	 that	 is	good	 is	necessarily	
11   
When	 I	 say	 that	A  is  better  than  B,	 I	 mean	
that A  is  all-things-considered  better  than  B. 
The	claim	is	not	equivalent	with	the	proposi-
tion that A is better than B in every respect, or 
that A in itself is better than B in itself, that is, 
that A is intrinsically better than B,	or	that	we	
should	choose	A	if	we	have	to	choose	between	
A and B. For more on various value relations 
and	preference	 relations,	 see,	 e.g.,	Chisholm	
and	Sosa,	1966;	Åqvist,	1968;	Hansson,	2001,	
2001b.	 Several	 deontic	 logicians	 have	 sug-
































alent	highest	goods.	Can	 there	 also	be	 two	 (or	more)	non-equivalent	final,	
greatest,	complete	goods	(good	things,	states	of	affairs)?	Our	next	 theorem	
proves that this is not possible.
T19.	There	are	no	two	non-equivalent	things	(states	of	affairs)	that	are	com-
plete	goods.	More	precisely,	it	is	not	the	case	that	there	is	an	X and a Y	such	
that	it	is	not	the	case	that	X and Y	are	necessarily	equivalent	and	both	X and Y 
are	complete	goods.
Proof.	Suppose	that	the	theorem	is	false	in	some	possible	world	w.	Hence,	it	




by	Z in w,	it	follows	that	if	W is good then W	is	necessarily	implied	by	Z in 
w. But W is good in w.	Hence,	Z	necessarily	implies	W in w.	Since	everything	
that	is	good	is	necessarily	implied	by	W,	it	follows	that	if	Z is good then Z 
is	necessarily	implied	by	W in w. Yet, Z is good in w.	Hence,	W	necessarily	
implies Z in w.	Since	Z	necessarily	implies	W in w, and W	necessarily	implies	
Z in w,	it	follows	that	Z and W	are	necessarily	equivalent	in	w.	However,	this	
is	absurd.	Hence,	our	theorem	must	be	true.	■
Theorem	19	is	equivalent	with	the	following	proposition:	if	X	is	a	final	good	
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Proof.	T20	follows	more	or	less	immediately	from	T17	and	T19.	Even	so,	let	
us	consider	an	alternative	proof.	Suppose	X	is	a	final	 good.	Then	X is good 
(by	T16).	Hence,	it	is	necessary	that	The	Good	implies	X	(by	T6).	This	proves	
one	direction.	Suppose	now	that	X	is	a	final	 good	but	that	it	is	not	the	case	
































good	iff	 there	 is	a	distinct	good	Y	such	that	X	 is	a	(necessary)	means	to	Y. 
For if Y is good and X	is	a	necessary	means	to	Y, then X	is	good	(this	is	easy	
to	prove	in	our	system).	I	have	included	the	phrase	‘X	 is	good’	in	the	right	
member	of	the	equivalence	since	I	want	to	emphasise	that	everything	that	is	
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that	it	is	not	the	case	that	if	X is good then X	is	instrumentally	or	non-instru-
mentally	good	in	some	possible	world	w. Then X is good in w, and it is not 
the	case	that	X	is	instrumentally	or	non-instrumentally	good	in	w.	Hence,	X 
is	not	instrumentally	good	in	w, and X	is	not	non-instrumentally	good	in	w. 
Let	us	use	‘X	is	a	means	to	something	good’	as	an	abbreviation	of	‘there	is	a	
distinct	good	Y	such	that	X	is	a	(necessary)	means	to	Y’.	It	follows	that	it	is	
not	the	case	that	X is good and a means to something good and that it is not 
the	case	that	X is good and not a means to something good in w.	Since	X is 





X	is	a	final	good	but	not	a	non-instrumental	good	in	w.	Hence,	X is good and 
everything	that	is	good	is	necessarily	implied	by	X in w. Moreover, it is false 
in w that X	is	good	and	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	there	is	something	that	is	not	
necessarily	equivalent	with	X	that	is	good	and	necessarily	implies	X.	Since	X 
is good in w,	it	follows	that	there	is	something	that	is	not	necessarily	equiva-
lent	with	X	that	is	good	and	necessarily	implies	X in w.	Consequently,	it	is	true	
in w	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	X	is	necessarily	equivalent	with	W, that W is 
good, and that W	necessarily	implies	X.	Since	everything	that	is	good	in	w is 
necessarily	implied	by	X in w,	it	follows	that	if	W is good then X	necessarily	
implies W in w. But W is good in w.	Hence,	it	is	necessary	that	X implies W 
in w.	Accordingly,	X	is	necessarily	equivalent	with	W in w. For W	necessarily	
implies X in w, and X	necessarily	implies	W in w. Yet, this is absurd. Conse-
quently,	our	theorem	is	established.	■
T24.	The	Good	is	non-instrumentally	good.
Proof.	T24	 follows	 from	T17	and	T23.	The	Good	 is	a	final	 good	 (T17).	 If	
The	Good	 is	 a	 final	 good,	 then	The	Good	 is	 non-instrumentally	 good	 (by	
T23).	Hence,	The	Good	is	non-instrumentally	good.	Despite	that,	let	us	verify	
this	result	by	a	more	direct	proof.	Suppose	that	The	Good	is	not	non-instru-







that	is	good	and	that	necessarily	implies	The	Good	in	w. Therefore, it is true 
in w	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	W	is	necessarily	equivalent	with	The	Good,	that	




The  Good  in  w′.	 It	 follows	 that	The	Good	does	not	materially	 imply	W  in  
w′.	Hence,	The	Good	is	true	and	W is false in w′.	Since	W is good in w, it is 
necessary	that	W is good in w	(by	T5).	Therefore,	W is good in w′.	For	w′	is	
alethically	accessible	from	w.	Since	The	Good	is	true	in	w′,	it	follows	that	w′	










The	Good	‘The	Good’;	we	can	give	it	other	names:	The Ideal, The Summum 
Bonum, The Absolute Good, The Highest Good, Utopia, The Complete Good, 
The Greatest Good, The Kingdom of Ends, Heaven.	Let	me	close	with	another	
kind	of	question:	What	is	The	Good?	To	what	category	does	it	belong?
I	suggest	that	we	can	conceive	of	The	Good	as	a	kind	of	object.	We	can	have	


























Åqvist,	 Lennart	 (1968).	 “Chisholm-Sosa	Logics	 of	 Intrinsic	Betterness	 and	Value”.	 In:	
Noûs	2	(1986)	3,	pp.	253–270.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.2307/2214721.
Åqvist,	Lennart	(2002).	“Deontic	Logic”.	In:	Gabbay,	Dov	M.;	Guenthner,	Franz	(eds.):	
Handbook of Philosophical Logic.	Vol.	8.	Dordrecht	–	Boston	–	London:	Kluwer	Academic	
Publishers.	PP.	147–264.
Aristotle (1992). The Nicomachean Ethics.	Translated	by	Sir	David	Ross.	Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press.




into the Relationships Among the...
Bernstein,	M.	(2001).	“Intrinsic	Value”.	In:	Philosophical Studies	102	(2001)	3.	PP.	329–
343.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1010384106310.
Bradley,	 Ben	 (2002).	 “Is	 Intrinsic	 Value	 Conditional?”.	 In:	 Philosophical Studies 107	
(2002)	1.	PP. 23–44.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1013165112545.
Bradley,	Ben	(2006).	“Two	Concepts	of	Intrinsic	Value”.	 In:	Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice	9	(2006)	2.	PP.	111–130.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9009-7.
Butchvarov,	Panayot	(1989).	Skepticism in Ethics.	Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press.
Chisholm,	Roderick	M.	(1982).	Brentano and Meinong Studies.	Amsterdam	–	New	York:	
Rodopi.
Chisholm,	 Roderick	 M.;	 Sosa,	 Ernest	 (1966).	 “On	 the	 Logic	 of	 ‘Intrinsically	
Better’”.	 In:	 American Philosophical Quarterly	 3	 (1966)	 3.	 PP.	 1–6.	 doi:	 https://doi.
org/10.2307/20009209. 
Conee,	 Earl	 (1982).	 “Instrumental	Value	without	 Intrinsic	Value?”.	 In:	Philosophia  11  
(1982)	3–4,	pp.	345–359.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02380844.
Engstrom,	Stephen	(1992).	“The	Concept	of	the	Highest	Good	in	Kant’s	Moral	Theory”.	
In:	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research	52	(1992)	4.	PP.	747–780.	doi:	https://doi.
org/10.2307/2107910.
Feldman,	Fred	(2000).	“Basic	Intrinsic	Value”.	In:	Philosophical Studies 99	(2000)	3.	PP. 
319–346.	https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1018614917379.
Gabbay,	Dov	M.	et al.	(eds.,	2013).	Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. 
College	Publications.
Hansson,	Sven	Ove	(2001).	The Structure of Values and Norms.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	
University	Press.
Hansson,	Sven	Ove	(2001b).	“Preference	Logic”.	In:	Gabbay,	Dov	M.;	Guenthner,	Franz	
(eds.):	Handbook of Philosophical Logic.	Vol	4.	Dordrecht	–	Boston	–	London:	Kluwer	
Academic	Publishers.	PP.	319–393.
Höwing,	Thomas	(ed.,	2016).	The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy.	Berlin	–	Boston:	
Walter	de	Gruyter.




Korsgaard,	Christine	M.	 (1996).	Creating the Kingdom of Ends.	Cambridge	University	
Press.
Lemos,	 Ramon	M.	 (1991).	 “Bearers	 of	Value”.	 In:	Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research	51	(1991)	4.	PP.	873–889.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.2307/2108186.















into the Relationships Among the...
Plato	(2013).	Republic.	Volume	I–II:	Books	1–10.	Edited	and	 translated	by	Christopher	
Emlyn-Jones,	William	Preddy.	Cambridge	(MA):	Harvard	University	Press.
Plato	 (1925).	Statesman. Philebus. Ion.	 Translated	 by	Harold	North	 Fowler,	W.	R.	M.	
Lamb.	Cambridge	(MA):	Harvard	University	Press.




Proclus	(1963).	The Elements of Theology.	Translated	by	E.	R.	Dodds.	Oxford:	Clarendon	
Press.
Rabinowicz,	Wlodek;	Rønnow-Rasmussen,	Toni	(1999).	“A	Distinction	in	Value:	Intrinsic	
and	For	Its	Own	Sake”.	In:	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100	(1999)	1.	PP.	33–
49.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9264.00064.
Ross,	William	David	(1930).	The Right and the Good.	Indianapolis:	Hackett	Publishing.
Rönnedal,	 Daniel	 (2009).	 “Dyadic	 Deontic	 Logic	 and	 Semantic	 Tableaux”.	 In:	 Logic 
and Logical Philosophy	 18	 (2009)	 3–4.	 PP.	 221–252.	 doi:	 https://doi.org/10.12775/
llp.2009.011.





Rønnow-Rasmussen,	Toni;	Zimmerman,	Michael	J.	(eds.,	2005).	Recent work on intrinsic 
value.	Berlin:	Springer.
Scheler,	Max	(1973).	Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values.	Translated	by	
Manfred	S.	Frings,	Roger	L.	Funk.	Evanston:	Northwestern	University	Press.




Thomson,	Judith	Jarvis	(1997).	“The	Right	and	the	Good”.	In:	Journal of Philosophy 94 
(1997)	6.	PP.	273–98.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.2307/2564542.
Tolhurst,	William	(1983).	“On	the	Nature	of	Intrinsic	Value”.	In:	Philosophical Studies 43 
(1983)	3.	PP.	383–395.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00372374.
Tännsjö,	Torbjörn	(2005).	“A	Concrete	View	of	Intrinsic	Value”.	In:	Rønnow-Rasmussen,	
Toni;	 Zimmerman,	 Michael	 J.	 (eds.,	 2005).	 Recent work on intrinsic value.	 Berlin:	
Springer.	PP.	207–211.
van	 Fraassen,	 B.	 C.	 (1972).	 “The	 Logic	 of	 Conditional	 Obligation”.	 In:	 Journal  of  
Philosophical Logic	1	(1972)	3–4.	PP.	417–438.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00255570.
von	Wright,	Georg	Henrik	(1963).	The Varieties of Goodness.	London:	Routledge	–	Kegan	
Paul.
Wedgwood,	 Ralph	 (2009).	 “The	 ‘Good’	 and	 the	 ‘Right’	 revisited”.	 In:	 Philosophical 









into the Relationships Among the...
Daniel	Rönnedal
Dobro:	istraživanje	veze	među	pojmovima	Dobro,
najviše dobro, dobrota, konačno dobro i neinstrumentno dobro
Sažetak
Rad se bavi Dobrim i njegovom vezom s različitim vrstama dobrote. Istražit ću što znači reći 
da je nešto najviše dobro, sveukupno, potpuno ili najveće dobro, te ću razmotriti neke definicije 
‘instrumentne’ i ‘neinstrumentne’ dobrote. Dokazat ću nekoliko zanimljivih teorema o Dobru i 
istražiti neke bitne veze među različitim vrstama dobrote.
Ključne	riječi
najviše dobro, Summum Bonum,	dobrota,	konačno	dobro,	neinstrumentna	dobrota,	Dobro
Daniel	Rönnedal
Gut:	Untersuchung	des	Zusammenhangs	zwischen	den	Begriffen	
Gut, höchstes Gut, Güte, Endgut und nicht instrumentelles Gut
Zusammenfassung
Das Paper befasst sich mit dem Guten und dessen Verknüpfung mit verschiedenen Arten von 
Güte. Ich werde ergründen, was es bedeutet zu sagen, dass etwas höchstes Gut, Gesamtgut, 
vollständiges Gut oder größtes Gut ist, und hiermit einige Definitionen von „instrumenteller“ 
und „nicht instrumenteller“ Güte in Augenschein nehmen. Ich werde für einige interessante 
Theoreme über das Gute Beweis erbringen und darüber hinaus etliche wesentliche Zusammen-




Le Bien : la recherche d’un lien parmi les concepts du Bien,
 du plus grand bien, de la bonté, du bien final et du bien non instrumental
Résumé
Ce travail porte sur le Bien et sur le lien qu’il entretient avec les différentes formes bonté. Je 
rechercherai quelle est la signification selon laquelle quelque chose constitue le bien suprême, 
général, total ou le plus grand bien, et j’examinerai quelques définitions de la bonté « instru-
mentale » et « non instrumentale ». Je démontrerai un nombre de théorèmes intéressants sur le 
Bien et rechercherai certains liens essentiels parmi les différentes formes de bonté.
Mots-clés
le plus grand bien, Summum Bonum,	bonté,	bien	final,	bonté	non	instrumentale,	Bien
